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You do not have to be a steady reader of the 
Congressional Record or even a C-SPAN 
junkie to spot the current upturn in federal reg-
ulation of business. Congressional action on 
well-intentioned but costly legislation is pro-
ceeding at a very rapid pace. The new Clean 
Air Act and the Americans With Disabili-
ties Act are just two reminders of the fact that 
the regulatory reform movement of the 1980s 
is over. It is being followed by the regulatory 
expansion of the 1990s, and the decade has just 
begun. 
Before I get into specifics, I would like to 
provide some overall perspective of the new 
trend. During the 1970s, the headcount of the 
federal regulatory agencies rose 62 percent. 
During the 1980s, the number of regulators 
dropped, from an all-time high of 119,000 in 
1980 to 106,000 in 1989-a 12 percent decline. 
The 1991 budget shows an increase of 7,500 
new regulators and that is before taking into ac-
count environmental and other statutes passed 
by the current session of the Congress. It hurts 
to say that once again we are seeing the ex-
panding regulatory trends of the Carter years. 
Regulation's Effect on Business 
All of American business is feeling the latest 
response of the Congress to environmental and 
other social pressures during a period of budget 
squeeze. We hear a lot of talk in Washington 
about off-budget spending as a way of getting 
around Gramm-Rudman limits on the deficit. 
Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for 
the Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt 
Distinguished University Professor at Washington 
University in St. Louis. 
1 
For government officials, regulation of business 
is a very neat way of advancing various public 
policy agendas without spending much federal 
money. Congress just imposes more burdens 
directly on firms. Remember the old saying, 
"The best tax is a hidden tax." 
At first glance, government imposing so-
cially desirable requirements on business seems 
to be a cheap way of achieving national objec-
tives. Moreover, regulation appears to cost the 
government very little and therefore does not 
seem to be much of a burden on the public. 
But the public does not escape paying the 
full cost. Every time a government agency-in 
its attempt to safeguard the environment or 
foster occupational health or promote product 
safety-imposes a more expensive method of 
production on business, the cost of the products 
being made will necessarily go up. 
Cost to Consumers 
If consumers knew how much they were 
paying for regulation, they probably would be 
very upset. Environmental regulations alone 
cost Americans more than a thousand dollars 
per family each year. But government agencies 
do not feel great pressure to worry about the 
expense. Those compliance costs do not show 
up in their budgets, but in the budgets of the 
private companies. 
Regulation is a hidden tax with a double 
payoff for politicians. First, they can crow to 
their constituents that they voted for clean air 
and in favor of people with disabilities and so 
forth. It must be a lot of fun to be a Senator or 
Representative; you can do so much good with 
other people's money. 
The second political payoff is that the same 
members of Congress can berate "greedy" 
companies for raising prices even though they 
are merely passing on the costs of complying 
with new federal mandates. Furthermore, it is 
the rare government official who acknowledges 
the connection between the high costs imposed 
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by government regulation and the difficulties 
that American businesses experience in trying 
to be competitive in an increasingly global 
marketplace. 
Environmental Regulation 
Twenty years after Earth Day 1970, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency is king of the 
regulatory hill. The EPA alone accounts for 
nearly one-third of the total spending of all the 
federal regulatory agencies. That is double its 
share in 1970. The combination of President 
Bush's pledge to be the "environmental presi-
dent" plus the emotional nature of the public 
reaction to any proposal with the word envi-
ronment in it virtually assures EPA its place at 
the top of the regulatory agencies for the 1990s. 
I11e new Clean Air Act will cost an 
added $25-35 billion a year, over and 
above the more than $100 billion spent 
annually on all pollution controls. 
The fact is that regulatory growth is more 
tied to dramatic news events than to public 
health risks or shortcomings in the marketplace. 
Thus, EPA spending rises with reports of leak-
ing dump sites. The Coast Guard budget bene-
fits from oil spills. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration outlays rise in response to shortcomings 
in approving generic drugs. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission grows following "in-
sider trading" abuses and other Wall Street 
scandals. 
Clean Air Act 
The new Clean Air Act will cost an added 
$25-35 billion a year, over and above the more 
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than $100 billion spent annually on all pollution 
controls. President Bush's initial proposal was 
touted as incorporating economic incentives to 
make the legislation more cost-effective. In-
deed, the final version does provide for creating 
tradeable emissions permits, which is a cost-
minimizing approach long advocated by econo-
mists. 
Unfortunately, these very same tradeable 
permit provisions became far more complex 
and far less economically sound as the Clean 
Air bill wended its way through the congres-
sional committee process. Other costly and 
burdensome features of the new law include re-
quiring many small companies to obtain emis-
sions permits from EPA and to continuously 
monitor their emissions. 
Indeed, the new Clean Air Act is riddled 
with numerous provisions that are needlessly 
costly. The smog provisions offer a particu-
larly cogent example. 
A substantial portion of the emissions that 
contribute to smog come about in refueling au-
tomobiles. One approach to control these emis-
sions is to require that gas stations put special 
controls on their pumps. The other approach is 
to mandate that automobile manufacturers put 
special equipment on the cars ("onboard con-
trols" is the jargon). Either approach could 
achieve the same reduction in overall emis-
sions. 
As you would suspect, there are pros and 
cons accompanying each of the two approaches. 
The gasoline producers favored onboard con-
trols on the car, while motor vehicle manufac-
turers naturally wanted to see the burden placed 
on the service stations. That put Congress in a 
position where they had to make a tough 
choice. 
Using somewhat twisted political reasoning, 
Congress chose the worst possible approach: 
They mandated both types of requirements. 
The legislation thus mandates two sets of costs 
to generate one set of benefits. It is like wear-
ing a belt and suspenders at the same time. 
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Other Environmental Regulations 
I wish I could say that the 1990 Clean Air 
Act is the end of the line. To the contrary, the 
legislative victory of the environmental activists 
only whetted their appetites. They are already 
gearing up for next year's legislative drive. 
According to their current plans, that includes 
tougher rules for toxic wastes. 
The battle over the revised toxic wastes law 
(the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) 
may focus more attention on small companies 
generating organic wastes from producing pes-
ticides and paints. Municipal solid waste dis-
posal may also be "federalized" to a much 
greater extent in the revised act--driving up 
disposal costs for residential, commercial and 
industrial non-hazardous waste management. 
Other Federal Regulation 
OSHA and MSHA 
Environmental regulation is not the only 
area of increased burdens that Washington is 
imposing on business. Buried in the recently 
approved budget deficit reduction package is a 
sharp seven-fold hike in maximum penalties for 
civil violations of Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA) regulations. This means 
that the top civil penalty for a single repeated or 
willful violation of OSHA will rise to $70,000; 
the compulsory minimum penalty for a willful 
violation is now $5,000. 
A parallel five-fold increase was mandated 
for civil violations of the Mine Safety and 
Health Act (MSHA). The Feds expect to raise 
more than $1 billion over five years from the 
two sets of fine increases. 
These onerous changes were a compromise. 
Some members of Congress were urging 
mandatory minimum penalties for all OSHA 
civil infractions, even the most trivial and un-
intentional. They dropped tougher criminal 
penalties only because they would not have 
raised much revenue. Pressure for revamping 
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the basic OSHA law continues and these issues 
will surface again. 
Americans With Disabilities Act 
The Americans With Disabilities Act is an-
other law whose title made it hard to oppose. 
Yet some of the detailed provisions in the new 
law are likely to be needlessly burdensome. 
The definition of disability is very broad, in-
cluding drug addicts and alcoholics. It took 
a lot of doing to get Congress to write in a 
provision that this complex new law does not 
cover current illegal drug users and alcoholics 
who cannot safely perform their jobs. That 
sounds as if the law could be interpreted as 
covering drug addicts who can safely perform 
their jobs. The special benefits of the new law 
are definitely extended to addicts who partici-
pate in a supervised rehabilitation program and 
are not currently using drugs. 
Employers must make a "reasonable ac-
commodation" for an individual with a disabil-
ity. This can include making existing facilities 
readily accessible, restructuring the job, modi-
fying work schedules, changing training poli-
cies, and providing interpreters. Moreover, an 
interviewer may not ask a job applicant if he or 
she has a disability or how severe it is. The 
employment rules take effect on July 20, 1992, 
for companies with 25 or more workers. Two 
years later, the cutoff is lowered to companies 
with 15 or more employees. 
Civil Rights Act 
The President did veto the new Civil Rights 
Act and his veto was sustained. But in view 
of the large majority in both houses that voted 
for it, it is likely that an effort will be made to 
pass similar legislation in the next session 
of Congress. The vetoed version would have 
become a lawyer's happy hunting ground be-
cause so many of the provisions are vaguely 
worded. 
Take the provision that "objective" evidence 
must be used to defend "subjective" hiring and 
promotion decisions. How can an employer 
6 
hiring someone for the first time provide objec-
tive evidence to prove that he or she is a better 
manager than someone else? Or better at deal-
ing with the public? These decisions are mat-
ters of personal judgment. Executives get paid 
for using judgment. If they have to do it by the 
numbers, they can hire a brand new MBA at 
half the price of an experienced individual-but 
that likely would violate the age discrimination 
law. 
Under the 1990 version of civil rights 
legislation, virtually the only way 
to avoid prolonged and costly 
litigation is to hire and promote 
on a racial quota basis. 
Under the approach embodied in the 1990 
version of civil rights legislation, virtually the 
only way for a company to avoid prolonged and 
costly litigation is to hire and promote on a 
racial quota basis. By the way, Congress itself 
would be exempt. That's not surprising be-
cause most regulatory statutes do not cover the 
legislative branch. 
11 Trust Busting11 Returns 
The enlightened merger attitude of the Rea-
gan administration has been replaced by old-
fashioned "trust busting," and that extends far 
beyond the corporate giants. 
For example, take the proposed joint ven-
ture of the two remaining major U.S. producers 
of high-grade telescopes. Both of these 
medium-sized companies are operating in the 
red. One of the two firms said publicly that, if 
the government turned down the joint venture, 
they would move production overseas; the other 
is likely to close down. Nonetheless, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission recently rejected the 
proposed combination. The result is bound to 
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be fewer telescopes produced in the United 
States and more unemployment (albeit small 
numbers) of American workers-but big gov-
ernment can crow that it succeeded in stopping 
a phantom "monopoly." 
Sauce for the Goose 
Some people fall into the common trap of 
associating wrongdoers, such as polluters, ex-
clusively with private business. Many compa-
nies in the private sector do generate lots of 
hazardous waste, and not all of them handle it 
properly. But the same can be said about fed-
eral government agencies, hospitals, schools, 
and colleges. Moreover, the regulatory agen-
cies lack the enforcement power over the public 
sector that they possess over the private sector. 
Reports of plant closings because of the high 
cost of meeting environmental and OSHA stan-
dards are common. In contrast, there is no 
record of a single government facility closing 
down because it was failing to meet the 
requirements of social regulations. 
Public Sector Abuses 
It is not surprising that the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) says, in its understated 
way, that the regulatory performance of federal 
agencies "has not been exemplary." One recent 
GAO study reported that, of 72 federal facilities 
inspected, 33 were in violation of EPA re-
quirements; and 22 of them had been cited for 
Class 1 (serious) violations. Sixteen of the 33 
facilities remained out of compliance for 
six months or more. Three had not been in 
compliance for more than three years. 
A follow-up report by the GAO showed lit-
tle further progress. Only 4 of 11 federal agen-
cies had ever completed the identification 
of hazardous waste sites and none had finished 
assessing the environmental problems they had 
uncovered. Of 511 federal sites failing to meet 
EPA standards, only 78 had been cleaned up. 
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The Department of Defense is a major of-
fender. It generates over 500,000 tons of haz-
ardous waste a year. That is more than is pro-
duced by the five largest chemical companies 
combined. 
The Department of Defense generates 
more hazardous waste a year 
(500,000 tons) than do the five largest 
U.S. chemical companies combined. 
The lax situation uncovered at Tinker Air 
Force Base in Oklahoma is typical of the way 
in which many federal agencies respond to the 
EPA's directives. Although Department of De-
fense policy calls for the military services to 
implement EPA's hazardous waste management 
regulations, Tmker has been selling waste oil, 
fuels, and solvents rather than recycling them. 
Also, personnel at that air force base dump 
hazardous wastes in landfills that themselves 
are in violation of EPA requirements. In one 
case, the EPA had been urging the Oklahoma 
Department of Health for years not to renew 
the permit for the landfill. In another instance, 
the State Water Resources Board is seeking a 
court order to close the site. Civilian agencies, 
including those in state and local governments, 
continue to be reluctant to follow the same 
standards that they impose on the private sec-
tor. 
To put it mildly, the federal government 
does not set a good example in complying with 
its own directives. It expects the private sector 
to take environmental, safety, and other social 
concerns far more seriously than it does itself. 
The late Admiral Hyman Rickover would toss 
inspectors from EPA and OSHA out of "his" 
Navy yards. What private company would dare 
to do that? 
My point is not to let anyone off the hook. 
The solution is quite obvious: what is sauce for 
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the private-sector goose should also be sauce 
for the public-sector gander. 
Business Strategies 
What can private firms do about the con-
tinued rise of government intervention in busi-
ness. Over the years, I have found that indivi-
dual companies react to changing public policy 
in four basic patterns: (1) passive, (2) anticipa-
tory, (3) accommodative, and (4) active. 
At different times or in dealing with differ-
ent agencies, some companies use all four. Let 
me elaborate on each of these approaches. 
Passive Approach 
Many corporate managements simply react 
to each new or expanded government initia-
tive-the passive approach. Before the passage 
of the original Clean Air Act, many manufac-
turing firms merely stonewalled when criticized 
by citizen groups for the large amounts of air 
pollution they were generating. Those man-
agements then criticized the government when 
the Act was passed. 
When new laws were passed, the same com-
panies tried to postpone the effects through liti-
gation and administrative appeals. But, ulti-
mate! y, they were forced to gear their opera-
tions to meet the new government require-
ments. 
Anticipatory Approach 
Because the passive approach means that the 
firm is always playing catch-up ball, some 
companies developed the anticipatory ap-
proach. In this case, corporate management 
tries to forecast likely further changes in gov-
ernment policies that affect business. The idea 
is to adjust operations ahead of time to mini-
mize the impacts of regulation when it does hit. 
Thus, before Congress enacted tightened air-
and water-pollution controls, some firms incor-
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porated more stringent ecological standards in 
their own capital projects. The intent is 
to minimize the likelihood of subsequently run-
ning afoul of new federal regulations. 
Some companies take socially 
responsible actions on a voluntary 
basis in an effort to reduce the likeli-
hood of more stringent controls being 
enacted by government. 
Some companies also take socially responsi-
ble actions on a voluntary basis in an effort to 
reduce the likelihood of more stringent controls 
being enacted by government. An example is 
the extent to which companies and business as-
sociations have adopted standards for advance 
notification of plant closings, together with pri-
vate programs to reduce adverse impacts on 
employees and on the surrounding community. 
Nonetheless, in 1988 Congress did pass legis-
lation mandating advance notice. Some compa-
nies supported the statutory requirement as a 
way of imposing costs on competitors that did 
not have voluntary programs. 
As corporate executives become more alert 
to evolving social demands, they try to respond 
to some of the public's expectations as a normal 
aspect of conducting business. To the extent 
that this positive development occurs voluntar-
ily, businesses themselves provide an offset to 
the political pressure that social activists can ef-
fectively exert against them. 
Why should consumers go to Ralph Nader 
for help if someone in the company will handle 
their complaint? As a result, the consumer 
movement today lacks the dynamism of the 
1970s. In part, this is because business firms 
have been better able to anticipate consumers' 
wishes and to respond to them. 
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Accommodation Approach 
The accommodation approach is the one 
that companies often follow but are reluctant to 
admit to. Intentionally or unintentionally, they 
make generous financial contributions to ac-
tivist groups that criticize their industry in the 
hope that they will pick on someone else. 
By the way, the labor unions do not play 
that game. They are not shy about supporting 
consumer and other activist groups, but they 
receive a quid pro quo. Those groups give 
them a wide berth and practically never oppose 
or even criticize labor's public policy positions. 
That is not surprising because unions limit their 
funds to organizations which are sympathetic to 
their objectives. 
The supposedly hard-nosed executives of 
many companies are far more naive. They 
contribute to the very organizations that spon-
sor the proposals that are creating the current 
new wave of government regulation. Paying 
"protection money" does not work. In fact, it 
is counterproductive because it strengthens the 
opposition. 
The passive, anticipatory, and accommo-
dating approaches all share a common short-
coming: the companies using this response are 
always on the defensive. They are constantly 
dealing with new or expanded forms of gov-
ernment intervention. 
Active Approach 
Under the circumstances, a growing number 
of companies attempt to head off or shape the 
character of government intervention by play-
ing a more active role in the public policy 
arena. Thus, some companies have beefed up 
their Washington offices to deal with pending 
legislation and new regulation. Others have set 
up such operations if they did not already exist. 
They also have increased their support of trade 
associations that are active on Capitol Hill. In 
view of the restrictions on political contribu-
tions by corporations, many business execu-
tives, as individuals, attempt to exercise lever-
age on government decision making by partici-
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pating more actively in the political process or 
by forming PACs. 
A good knowledge of the public policy 
process enables businesses legally and 
legitimately to influence government 
policies that affect them. 
These business firms also make extensive 
use of in-house publications, communications to 
shareholders and media to raise the public 
awareness of political issues that affect the fu-
ture of the business community. Corporate ex-
ecutives increasingly volunteer to testify at 
congressional hearings. 
Nonetheless, a recent survey of 150 CEOs 
reported that only one out of four even try to 
affect public pol icy. However, the same survey 
showed that more than 70 percent believe that 
government policies and attitudes are an im-
portant determinant of their competitive posi-
tions. It is intriguing to note that, of the CEOs 
who attempt to influence public policy, three-
fourths believe that their efforts are successful. 
A good knowledge of the public policy pro-
cess enables businesses legally and legitimately 
to influence government policies that affect 
them. Often the most effective form of influ-
ence is making available to government deci-
sion makers prompt, factual, and detailed anal-
yses of the impacts of proposed legislation. 
Every member of Congress listens when some-
one describes how a bill will affect his or her 
district. 
Conclusion 
This essay is hardly a plea to oppose all ef-
forts to provide a safer environment or a 
healthier workplace. Contrary to rumors, econ-
omists breathe the same air and drink the same 
water as real people. The challenge is how to 
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achieve the nation's environmental objectives in 
the most efficient manner. 
Society's bottom line is not the 
impact of regulation on government or 
on business-but the effect on the 
consumer, on the citizen. 
As a first step, we all need to improve our 
understanding of the new wave of government 
regulation. There is no good reason why gov-
ernment should adopt the most disruptive and 
costly way of cleaning the air or the nation's 
rivers. After all, society's bottom line is not 
the impact of regulation on government or on 
business-but the effect on the consumer, on 
the citizen. It is consumers who wind up pay-
ing the cost of regulation every time they buy a 
product whose price includes the rising expense 
of complying with an ever-widening array of 
governmental directives. 
Regulation also often generates unexpected 
negative effects, such as stifling innovation. I 
sincerely doubt that Henry Ford's original 
model T could have survived today's regulatory 
challenges. After all, it had no pollution gear 
and it was dangerous. Why, you could break 
your arm cranking it. 
In any event, reducing the extent of federal 
regulation does not seem to have as much at-
traction for policymakers in the early 1990s as 
it did in the early 1980s. The best that we can 
hope for is to cool the regulatory fever by en-
couraging government, in the regulations that it 
does adopt, to rely more fully on economic in-
centives and to weigh more carefully the bene-
fits they expect against the costs they are im-
posing. 
It may sound technical, but imposing a bene-
fit-cost test would do a great deal to slow down 
new regulation. So many of the federal agen-
cies would be unable to show that their rulings 
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would meet the simplest benefit-cost require-
ment. 
But perhaps the most powerful response to 
the new wave of federal regulation of business 
is to get consumers to understand that business 
is just a middleman. The cost of complying 
with regulations-like any other cost-shows 
up in the higher prices that people pay for the 
products that they buy. 
Helping the public understand the limits of 
government regulation is another fundamental 
educational effort. Even if the EPA were 
staffed entirely with Newtons and Einsteins, it 
could not meet the present statutory expecta-
tions of cleaning all of the water, air, and land 
in and around the United States. Nor can the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission effec-
tively regulate the 2 million companies pro-
ducing the 10,000 products within its jurisdic-
tion. 
The need is not for greater compassion, 
commitment, or technological expertise-those 
we have in abundance. What is required now is 
the willingness and the courage on the part of 
Congress and the White House to make difficult 
choices among the overwhelming array of de-
mands by interest groups for more government 
regulation of business. 
To use a medical analogy, regulation is a 
very powerful medicine. The congressional 
doctor should prescribe it in small doses 
with full regard to all of the adverse side effects 
on employment, innovation, productivity, and 
competitiveness. Moreover, regulation is an 
expensive medicine and the consumer winds up 
paying the bill. 
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